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1. Introduction: Happy Retirement'.
Entering a social security scheme can be a happy event. It is even worthwhile a congratulation:
'Happy retirement!'-cards can be found in many Dutch stalls selling wishing cards for special
events. The existence of these retirement cards attracts our attention to the fact that retirement
is a special moment, accompanied by a, though modest, transition ritual.
The cards show us what kind of transition is addressed. Illustrations 1 and 2 show two of these
cards. The}~ both point at the activities the congratulated person is expected to perform, which
is nearly everything except for work. They also contain information on the moment of
transition: 65 is the happy moment on one card, the other card shows us an 'age-meter'; the
relevant ages to enter retirement range from just below 60 to 65. These ages refer to retirement
ages in the Dutch pre-retirement scheme (VUT) and the public pension scheme (AOW).
This study aims to give an answer to the question why age and why certain age boundaries mark
the transition to retirement. In our society, age is a normal aspect of everyday life. The last two
decades however, age-criteria in work and social security are under scrutiny for reasons of
growing financial demands on pension schemes and growing awareness of age-discrimination.
Some even argued we are heading to an age-irrelevant society, because age is becoming a very
poor predictor of physical, intellectual or social performance (Neugarten, 1982).
The tendenc}~ however, is that age criteria remain important. Reductions for swimming pools,
cinemas, public transport, hairdressers and many other goods and services are available from
the aee of 60 or 65 onwards. Provocative is the idea to apply age criteria in the health sector,
as a way of setting limit to expensive medical progress (Callahan, 1987).
Retirement ages are among the most widely applied and most debated age criteria. The
retirement age is a point of reference in peoples lives and in all kinds of regulations (a.o.
Huizer, 1991). It is surprising to notice that many of the debates on retirement ages are about
which age should be chosen as the retirement age. The question whether age is a good criterion,
is hardly ever addressed. This is astonishing, when we realize that age is by no means the only
possible demarcator of entrance to a pension scheme. Pensions could also be paid a~cording to
the distributive criteria used in many other social security schemes. Distribution according to
physical~mental capacity, financial need, employment record, or the contributions paid, is
possible. Along these criteria, people can be classified as healthylill, as needy~not needy, or as
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deservinglnon-deserving. Instead, we are left with the classification oldlnot old. This
classification is hard to understand without a deeper understanding of age criteria and the
context in which they are created.
In this paper, we leave the wide acceptance of age criteria far behind and attempt to trace why
age boundaries mark the transition to old age in social security'. To tackle this question, we
discuss theories explaining the phenomenon of 'old age' in Part One of this paper. In Part Two
we present results of our empirical study of the construction of age boundaries in three types
of pension schemes in Germany between 1880 and 1990.
PART I- THEORIES OF OLD AGE
Sociological approaches of old age are not primarily interested in how specific age boundaries
in social policy can be explained. Age boundaries are viewed upon as a limited part of broader
phenomena: age boundaries demarcate life stages and social roles. They indicate the moment
of a role transition: In the normal situation, people move at the retirement age from adulthood
and employment into old age and a period of rest. Thus, the retirement age refers to the moment
of the transition into old age. Most theoretical perspectives of old age are interested in why a
stage of 'old age' exists, why this transition from adulthood to old age takes place and how this
ageing process affects individuals.
The answers to these broader questions are relevant to our understanding of retirement ages.
We expect the theoretica] perspectives to broaden and deepen our understanding of old age
boundaries. At the same time, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of 'old age', by
studying the dynamics of age boundaries.
In the theoretical part of our paper, the discussion of three sociological perspectives places age
boundaries in social security against a broader sociological background. Two of these
perspectives - disengagement theory and the political economy of old age - present a distinct set
of beliefs on how old age is to be valued, interpreted and explained. They both have their
'Surprisingly few studies examined this question in detail, but see: Roebuck, 1978; Conrad,
1988; Conrad, 1994.
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counterparts in daily~ life. They can be viewed as ideological reflections and sources of the
construction of old age. A third perspective, more a scientific exercise than a distinct set of
beliefs, is discussed under the heading of life course sociology'-.
The three perspectives agree more or less on common descriptives of 'old age'. In this phase
of life, people's physical and mental abilities gradually decrease, most people are retired from
formal, paid employment, have no children to raise and receive an old age pension. But when
we look more closely at the descriptions, consensus soon breaks apart. While a supporter of the
Disengagement- theory would send his colleagues, friends and relatives a'Happy Retirement!'-
card, a Political Economist would not dare think of sending one.
2. Ageing is disengaging - Disengagement theory
An influential, attractively simple, but controversial theory of old age is Disengagement Theory.
Its primary. position in the American academic debate of the 1960-s, was quickly taken over by
other theories. A revival of the theory seems on its way, it is stated that 'the disengagement
mind-set is alive, well, and widespread (Hendricks, 1994:753).
The foundation of disengagement theory was laid in 'Growing Old' (Cumming 8z Henry, 1961).
The theor}~ is presented as social-psychological and aims at offering a bridge between
personality theory and social theory (ibid.:10). Its roots in social theory are very direct; Parsons
wrote the foreword to this book and one of the successive publications (WilliamslWirths,
1965)'.
2We have looked in detail only at these three theories, out of a large number of
gerontological perspectives, for both practical and substantial reasons. Each of these theories
is relevant to the topic of retirement ages, corresponds with opinions on retirement ages in the
public debate, pays attention to the broader motives and structures behind the existence of a
phase of old age and a category of the elderly and can be used to explain changes in 'old age'.
3In the Forewords however, Parsons is not very explicit in how disengagement theory
exactly fits into his Theory of action. The interest of Cumming and Henry in the interface
between personality and society is clearly rooted in Parsonian concepts. His influence on the
Williams 8c Wirth study though, is more manifest.
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In 'Growing Old', the basic propositions of activity theory are challenged and a new theory is
postulated into nine formal statements ( Cumming 8c Henry, 1961:210-218). Activity theory is
presented as the implicit theory of ageing, in which successful ageing is defined as staying
active and resisting withdrawal of the social world. Disengagement theory presents an opposite
view: old age should be seen as a mutual withdrawal of ageing individuals and the social
system. The ageing process is presented as inevitable, as death is universal and decrement of
ability is probable. The process of disengagement is a gradual process, beneficial to both
individual and society. Older people want to be relieved from demanding societal task and roles.
Individuals adapt and take on less and more peripheral roles, while their abilities decline
inevitably. To society, this adaptation is useful, because all societies need to replace older by
younger people. Thus, ageing is a positive process.
Retirement is seen as the representation of the visible point at which the central tasks of inen
are terminated. Retirement can be seen as the marker of the male disengagement process.
Cumming 8c. Henry treat widowhood as the transition state of women. They argue that in their
surve}~ retirement proved to be unimportant to women`.
In concern to retirement the same, micro- and macro points of view are applied. Retirement is
in the first place regarded as society's permission to men to disengage. Retirement policies
mostly disregard the utility of skills and apply automatically. Secondly, most men appear to be
ready to disengage.
No attention is paid to age criteria as such, but the abruptness of retirement is signalled. This
abruptness is seen as the consequence of 'universalistic criteria of performance' (p.212-3)5, on
personal skill and knowledge and not on biological or cultural heredity. Age-grading is a
mechanism to insure that the young are trained and the old are retired before they loose skill.
'They state that this may be caused by the fact their study is based on a limited number of
interviews with women from a working and middle class background (Cumming 8c Henry,
1961:144).
SComparable to one of the dilemmas of social systems distinguished by Parsons:
universalism versus particularism.
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The transition from engagement to disengagement is dependent on the older individual and
society. The process of disengagement may be started by both, but when society is ready for
disengagement and the individual is not, usually disengagement follows.
Retirement often poses problems to men, in terms of loss of status, social contacts and lack of
other activities. The disjunction between the system and the individual ma}~ be more severe to
some than to others, as is analyzed in more detail in Williams 8t Wirths with help of the
concept of successful ageing. In Growing Old it is emphasized that to most men, this is only
a temporary adaptation problem.
Till so far a short summary of disengagement theory. Critiques of the theory came quickly and
in large numbers. The critiques covered most central assumptions and conclusions (see
AchenbaumlBengtson, 1994). Its universality was under attack by referring to cultures where
the elderly gain more status and power as they age. The general application of the theory to all
elderly in Western culture was criticized by reference to the differential paths of disengagement,
which are dependent on a person's personality, his opinions on ageing and retirement, his
education and occupation.
When later on the disengagement concept was refined, universality and inevitability of
disengagement were shaded. The different location of individuals in different social contexts was
taken into account and a distinction between successful, less successful and least successful agers
was constructed.
The theory is also accused of legitimizing the exclusion of elderly from important political,
social and economic positions. It induces people to accept ageing as a natural, positive process.
This criticism is especially made by supporters of the theoretical perspective which will be
discussed in the next section: the political economy of old age.
The disengagement concept however, never really disappeared frum the scene. It penetrates
societal debates and personal action. Intuitively, the universal fate of death makes the idea of
disengagement easy to accept. The positive, romantic vision of gradual retreat is an attractive
vision.
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3. Exclusion of the elderl}~ - The political economy of old age
The political economy of old age is a second, powerful set of beliefs concerning old age, based
on neo-marxist thinking. It is a reaction to the idea of ageing as a natural, inevitable and
acceptable disengagement process. Authors in this, mainly Anglo-Saxon, tradition are highly
critical of adaptation of older people to societal demands. The existence of a phase of old age
and a category of the elderly must not be seen as a normal condition, but as a problematic
construction. The political economy of old age aims to 'locate society's treatment of the aged
in the context of the economy (national and international), the state, the conditions of the labor
market, and the class, sex, race and age divisions in society.' (Estes, 1991:29).
In the early British variant of this perspective, called 'structured dependency theory', emphasis
is put on the situation of poverty and dependency in which many elderly find themselves
(Walker, 1980; Townsend, 1981). Retirement is one of the causes of structural dependency.
'Retirement is in a real sense a euphemism for unemployment. The phenomenon tias been
enforced and is being enforced in a number of industrial countries at earlier ages and yet is,
paradoxically, being represented as a social achievement ...' (Townsend, 1981:10).
In later publications the structured dependency of the elderly is accotrunodated within a larger
conceptual framework. The labour market and old age pension policies are held responsible for
the categorial exclusion of elderly from the labour market. Myles (1984) argues on the basis
of empirical research in the United States, Canada and Sweden, that the large unemployment
in the 1930-s created the opportunity for retirement on a large scale. Obligatory retirement
became the instrument to reduce the number of unemployed. Older employees were dismissed
at a certain age, without reference to their physical or mental capacities. The state plays a
crucial role: it defines the policy category of the elderly and regards the elderly as one coherent
group for which one categorial policy is applicable. Social policies appear to engender cultural
categories (Guillemard, 1983): Old age starts at the age defined by old age social policy.
In the political-economic vision of Myles, the institutions - the economy, the state - produce 'old
age'. Others humanized these institutions by emphasizing the constructive powers of employers,
labour unions, professionals and civil servants (see a.o. Townsend, 1986; Derthick, 1979). All
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actors together form the 'Aging Enterprise' (Estes, 1979) and isolate and stigmatize the elderl}~
with their age specific policies.
Although old age is seen as one homogeneous dimension and the elderly are one social
categor}., the political econom}~ of old age also paid attention to differences between elderly.
Class differences received attention. Dowd (1980) for example argues that age should always
be examined together with class. The lower classes loose their value on the labour market
quicker, have a higher chance of becoming unemployed and a higher chance to retire early, than
the middle and higher classes (Estes, 1991; Lackzo 8c Phillipson, 1991). To a lesser extent, also
ethnicity and its relation to old age is discussed in American literature (Minkler 8r. Robertson,
1991). The risks of flexible labour, with part-time jobs and temporary contracts, produce new
inequalities in old age (Walker et al., 1991).
The political econom}~ of old age also received a lot of criticism: We discuss the major points:
Firstly, elderly are reduced to passive receivers of policies and retirement is reduced to a
negative experience. It is argued that for many people retirement can be a positive experience.
The fear of dismissal is over and responsibility over one's own time is regained (Kohli, 1985).
The success of retirement among employees is hard to explain from a strict political economic
logic: ~~hy would employees want to establish their own future marginality? Authors with a
political-econom}~ background have admitted that older people would not be more independent
when they would stay in employment. The poor elderly also belonged before their retirement,
to the employees in the lower paid sectors with high unemployment risks (Lackzo 8i, Phillipson,
1991).
A second point of criticism concentrates on the radical suggestions of the political econom}~ of
old age. Fundamental societal change and a democratic socialism (Olson, 1982), radical change
and a socialist social policy (Phillipson, 1982) are demanded to solve the problem of the
dependent elderly. These suggestions are not attractive to politicians, policy-makers and
researchers. This is maybe why, at least in the Netherlands, this perspective is not well-known.
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4. The chronology of old age - Life course sociologr
Cuntrary to disengagement theory and the political economy of old age, life course theory
presents a less outspoken perspective on 'old age'. This perspective contaíns interpretations of
old age which do not directly correspond with ideological practices. Life course theory is, more
than the other theoretical perspectives, an intellectual exercise.
Much of the academic debate on old age takes place under the umbrella of the life course
paradigm. We restrict ourselves to a limited part of life course sociology, to which the timing
of transitions in the life course is central. Two authors are in this respect of special relevance
to us: Kohli and Baars. Both stress the importance of chronology in the standard-life course.
Both address the fields of work and social security.
With 'chronologization' is referred to the process, in which transitions in the life course become
more strictly separated by age (Kohli, 1985). In the course of the modernization process, age
became an important criterion. Transitions are closely related to cenain ages and became more
uniform, rigid and predictable. Baars refers to this process with 'Regime of the Clock' (Baars,
1991a).
A second crucial concept is the 'standard life course' (Kohli, 1985). The standard, or normal,
life course consists of three phases and is organized in different institutions. In the first phase,
young people are brought up and educated. Their roles and the moment of transition to the next
phase are defined in the education system. The second phase is the productive and reproductive
phase, in which work and family are the central institutions. The third phase, old age, is a phase
of rest, without obligations to employers or children. Retirement is the central institution in
relation to this third life phase.
Thus, the life course is organized around special, standardized life events. Retirement is such
a special event and old age can hardly be understood without retirement. Until the 1960-s, the
timing of retirement became less and less variable. The formal retirement age marked the
transition to retirement.
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Why did the standard life course become so important? And why is it chronologicall}~
structured? Baars nor Kohli presents a simple, straightforward framework with which these
qL~estions can be answered. Rather, the life course is seen as the result of a complex,
constitutive complex in which different circumstances and factors pla}~ a role (Baars, 1988;
Kohli, 1985)~.
Characteristic of this approach is the understanding of the constitution of 'old age' through
structural, organizational and individual factors. In combining the work of the two authors, we
came to the following three sets of factors': (1) norms and values concerning old age (2) the
organization of retirement; (3) biographical perspectives.
Firstly, the standard phase of old age can be understood by reference to cultural meaning
structures. A deficit-model of old age is prevalent in western society; ageing is presented as a
process of physical and mental deca}~. This negative stereotyping of the elderly occurs against
the background of the growing importance of norms of achievement and competition (Baars,
1988;1991b). Negative views of an economically active old age, as well as ideas on old age as
an enjo}.able phase in life and the ethic of leisure, promote the acceptance and solid embedding
of old age in society (Kohli, 1981).
Secondl}~, the constitution of old age can be understood in terms of the organization of modern
society. Bureaucratization brought artificial career patterns, based on among others age criteria.
Age became a classifying principle after the Code Napoleon was introduced in 1841 and vital
statistics like the date of birth were systematically gathered (see Cain, 1976). Another aspect
of this rationalization, was the shift of responsibility from individuals, to firms and eventually
to societ}~ and the state. With the disappearance of owner-employers, who gave their older
employees easier jobs to end their careers, moral responsibility disappeared from the firm level.
Moralit}~ moved to institutional arrangements in social security. Age became an important,
seemingl}- objective criterion to solve problems of succession (Kohli, 1989).
óThough Kohli speaks of 'construction' of old age, he argues that it is a gross misconception
to think that old age or old age boundaries can easily be changed (see a.o. Kohli, 1993:179).
Baars chooses for the word 'constitution', because he believes old age is not always consciously
constructed (Baars, 1991a, p. 222-3).
'This is our own division, of course based on a study of the work of both authors.
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A third dimension behind the existence of a phase of old age, is the biographical dimension.
The institution of the life course structures the time perspective of individuals (Kohli, 1985).
Individuals act according to the given structures. develop a long-term perspective and act with
the idea of a'Normalbiographie' in mind. The standard-life course becomes object of individual
planning. It is an institute regulating the actions of human beings, it integrates individuals in
society and is a source of security. Individuals compare and judge others by their age and
consolidate the age criteria formulated in the structure and organization of life-phases.
The descriptions of chronologization and the development of the standard life course attracted
criticism. The main point of critique concerns the teleological line of reasoning. The process
of chronologization is often explained in terms of the functions - succession and integration -
it is said to serve. Age criteria are very easily and smoothly explained by reference to
organizational and individual needs. Wohlrab-Sahr (1992) argues in this respect that in the work
of Kohli, chronologization is accepted as a kind of universal development, which is not
extensively empirically validated. This same criticism can be applied to the work of Baars.
This raises the questions whether life courses are standard life courses and whether they are
reall}' organized around uniform and rigid age criteria. There is some empirical evidence, that
other tendencies can be observed, also before the 1960-s. Regulations also produced
heterogeneous age-criteria. Cain (1976) even refers to a development contrary to
chronologization, age asynchronization. Formal age boundaries existed in very different forms
and numbers. An examination of current formal age boundaries in Dutch law, confirms that age
boundaries have been formulated in the course of this century in large varieties (Huizer, 1991).
This shows that, though chronology is very important, legally defined transitions in the life
course are not necessarily uniform and rigid.
Another question raised is whether the concepts of chronologization and standard life course are
not too much tied to the world of paid work. This excludes the life courses of women. It also
overlooks the fact that non-work events can also be important transitional life-events (Thomae
8c Lehr, 1985).
It seems that the concepts of chronologization and the standard life course still need to go
through detailed empirical examinations to establish their value as descriptive and analytic
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concepts. Maybe social scientists embraced chronologization too quickly, tempted to produce
an attractive order out of chaos. An order however, that undoubtedly helps us in thinking age
boLndaries through.
5. A multiple perspective on old age
The theoretical perspectives each produce a very distinct approach of the phenomenon of 'old
age'. The}~ guide us and draw our attention to which aspects of 'old age' are important. In
disengagement theory, the process of ageing is explained as the result of the mutual, functional
disengagement of individual and society. In the political economy of old age, the policy
category of the elderly is the central focus. This category is seen as a creation of capitalist
economy, legitimizing the exclusion of less useful and powerful people. In life course sociology,
old age is a chronologically structured phase in the standard life course, constituted by a process
in which norms and values on old age, the organization or retirement and biographical
perspectives pla}~ a role.
Our vision on old age is dependent on which perspective is chosen. Strongly put, disengagement
theor}~ and the chronologization thesis in life course sociolog}~, underpin the current social
practice of retirement at a certain age. Using these perspectives, the normality of retirement and
the retirement age, can be understood and accepted.
The political econom}~ of old age on the other hand, takes a critical stand towards current
retirement practices and criticizes the forced nature of retirementg.
These large differences in the explanation and evaluation of 'old age' can be judged as
limitations and it can be argued that none of these theories adequately explains 'old age'Q. I
thinl: it is exactly the wide range of explanations, which is useful to gain a full understanding
SParadoxically, this opinion is now supported not by the lower class, poor elderly on which
the political economy concentrates, but by higher class, well educated people who wish to
remain active longer.
9This is the conclusion of Hooyman 8c Asuman Kiyak after reading a large number of
gerontological theories (1992:81).
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of old age as a social phenomenon. Seemingly contradictory, the perspectives become
complementary when we look upon old age not as an abstract, universal phenomenon, but as
a phenomenon with many faces and different backgrounds.
This approach of old age as a diverse phenomenon, is supported by the fact that different
theoretical perspectives can be combined to explain specific situations. Let us turn shortly to two
examples. It does not require an extensive empirical examination, to notice that both negative
and positive evaluations of retirement exist among employees and retirees. Some wish to remain
in their jobs, are unhappy to retire and protest against forced retirement. In the Netherlands for
example, university professors and psychiatrists openly disagreed with retirement, while others
want to escape their job as quickly as possible.
It is also clear that a perspective which does not pay attention to the different timing and
different experience of retirement between men and women, overshoots its mark. To men,
retirement may often bring a sudden and complete shift in daily activities, while to many women
who do not work full-time before reaching the retirement age, the transition is much less
radical.
Each of the three perspectives discussed, can contribute to a better understanding of the
situations sketched in these two examples. Disengagement theory can explain the positive
experience of retirement and the gradual disengagement process of women. With the political
economy perspective, the negative experience of old age can be understood. Taking the
perspective of the authors of the chronologization thesis, the sudden transition of inen into
retirement can be explained from the drive towards rational and objective policy making. Thus,
the theoretical perspectives together increase our understanding of old age.
The major reason why we need to combine different perspectives, is the diversity of old age.
None of the discussed perspectives succeeds in fully incorporating this diversity. In the next
section we will reflect on the diversity of old age and the limitations of theories in this respect.
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6. The diversity of old age
1 heories of old age were from the very beginning accompanied by criticisms of the fact that the
homogeneous dimension of old age is emphasized too heavily. The tension between
homogeneity and heterogeneity of old age is an acknowledged problem (see a.o. Nelson 8t
Dannefer, 1992).
The visibility of this tension is intensified by the growing empirical evidence on the diversity
of old age. The 'myth of homogeneity' (Minkler 8c Robenson, 1991) is successfully under
attack. Characteristics of the elderly and retirement, all turn out to be tnore variable than once
thought. Physical and mental condition; timing of retirement; eligibility for an old age pension;
experience of retirement: these characteristics of old age turn out variable when enough different
individuals are examined. Studies examining age-related changes of differences, typically
focused on central tendencies and mean-level differences and gave little attention to diversity
(Nelson 8z Dannefer, 1992:17). '
Research pointed at biological, occupational and generational differences in the ageing process
and among the elderl}~. Also differences between the sexes, between social classes, cultures and
ethnic groups were anal}~zed. More recently, in relation to social security, attention is drawn
to new inequalities between flexible and non-flexible workers and to the diversity found in (the
mix of) financial provisions for old age"'.
In most gerontological theories, these results were not, or only to a minor extent,
incorporated". Of the three perspectives we discussed in this paper, the political economy of
old age pays most attention to diversity, especially class differences are dealt with. A weakness
however, is that heterogeneity is not addressed in a very balanced way. The emphasis is
'o0ut of a large number of possible references, we mention the following: Occupational
differences and class differences (Lackzo 8c Phillipson, 1991); Generational differences
Townsend (1957); Cultures (Monk, 1994); Sexes (Arber 8c Ginn, 1991); Variation in retirement
policies (Williamson 8c Pampel, 1993).
"An exception is continuity theory, where personal life-styles reflect life long continuity and
older adults preserve ties with their own past experiences (Atchley, 1989). Gerontologists also
argued that the aged are the most heterogeneous of any age strata and differentiation increases
over the life course (Dannefer, 1987).
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generall}~ put on exclusion of lower class workers. This in fact results in a uniformization of
old age: the elderly are reduced to one dependent and needy category.
Within the life course perspective, variation is mainly sought in the life world of subjects. The
variety in the life world is contrasted with the uniform character of larger institutions, like for
example retirement. Baars, and to a lesser extent also Kohli are more concerned with
institutions than with individuals.
Disengagement theory is often described as paying no attention to diversity in the ageing
process. Cumming and Henry did describe the differential male and female ageing process.
Close reading also shows that Cumming and Henry were very well aware of the differences in
ageing and much more so than their criticasters try to make us believe. In Growing Old, they
strived for clear theoretical statements and were very explicit in their selective approach to reach
this aim. They minimized heterogeneity in their survey panel and aimed to stud}~ the normal
ageing process among healthy, economically stable Americans.
The lack of integration of diversity into theory is not a reason to change theories, because these
find their strength in the clarity of their propositions. Including every type of diversity would
result in a'theor}. of ever}'thing'. Rather, different theories must be combined.
Still then, it is relevant to know wh}~ the emphasis on the homogeneous qualities of old age is
so strong. How come this tendency to stress ageing as one process, old age as one phase of life
and the elderly as one category? In our view, this is due to three, interrelated mechanisms.
Firstly. as Dannefer 8c Nelson made clear, research focused on differences on the mean scores
between age groups and spent little attention to dispersion within groups. Secondly, the
perspectives we discussed, each approach old age in terms of its function and in terms of social
factors. They tend to have a deterministic and functionalíst view of social reality.
Notwithstanding the attention paid to the definitions of old age by individuals in life course
sociology and disengagement theory, and the attention for collective actors in political economy,
the emphasis is more on the needs of society. It is stated that the need for succession leads to
the construction of 'old age'; that unemployment produces old age, and old age is constituted
by stereotyping and administrative rationalization. Human action is mentioned but still at the
peripher}~ of these explanations. This creates a bias towards homogeneity of old age.
I6
This strongly relates to a third explanation of the pervasiveness of the idea of homogeneity of
old age: the generalizing view of policy. In the perspectives discussed, policy, and retirement
policy in particular, is referred to as one of the most important factors behind the existence of
old age. Though undoubtedly an important factor, it is not one simple, straightforward factor.
Policy~ comes in different forms. The multiple faces of welfare - social, occupational and fiscal
welfare - were revealed (Titmuss, 1963; Berghman, 1986).
In our opinion, the only way to really take into account the diversity of policy and old age, is
to leave the general level of social factors causing old age behind. We need to study old age
using a contextual and comparative method.
PART II - A?S EAIPIRICAL STUDY OF AGE BOUNDARIES: GERI~ZA.~'Y
7. Our approach: contexrtual and comparati~~e
In this study, age boundaries are examined in the social context they are created. We gathered
information on the arguments presented for and against certain age boundaries in different
situations. The intention is to find which interpretations of circumstances (demographic,
economic, political, cultural, ....) are behind the motivations to choose of reject a particular age
boundary in a concrete context. This approach is based on social-constructivist theory and
methodology'-.
We use data from primary sources, mainly accounts of parliamentary debates on retirement ages
and written statements of different parties and organizations. We also rely on secondary sources,
such as literature and research on pensions".
1zWe do not go into the specific details of social-constructivist theory in this paper. Our
theoretical points of reference are: Spector 8r. Kitsuse, 1977; Harré, 1986; Latour, 1987.
13The sources referred to in this paper are mentioned in the footnotes to sections 8 and 9.
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Our study is at the same time comparative. We do not only draw conclusions on the motivations
behind age boundaries in separate situations, but systematically compare these situations. The
comparative nature of this study is reflected in the fact that age boundaries are examined in two
countries (the Netherlands; Germany), in three different pension schemes (public pensions -
'Rentenversicherung'; private pensions 'betriebliche Altersversorgung'; civil servant pensions
'Beamtenversorgung') over a longer period of time (1880-1990). In this paper we report on age
boundaries in Germany.
This approach has its limitations. Firstly, we restrict ourselves to the formulation of age
boundaries. What happens after formulation is, though of course extremely relevant, no focus
of this study. Secondly, the concentration on arguments in public debates implies that what
happens behind the natíonal public stage escapes our attention. This means for example the role
officials play in different commissions behind the stage is excluded. The quality of our
information on private pensions is also affected. Decisions on private pensions are generally not
taken at the central, state level. Therefore, our case material on age boundaries in German
private pensions is less detailed and our conclusions are less outspoken than our information and
conclusions on the other pension schemes.
In the next sections, the first results of our study on Germany are presented. We report on the
two first steps of our analysis. Firstly, we give a short summary of the major findings of our
im~entor}- of changes in age boundaries in German pension schemes (Section 8). This inventory
is published in more detail in the Schemas attached to this paper. Secondly, we identify the most
important arguments behind the changes in age boundaries. Six dimensions of old age
boundaries are presented (Section 9). A third step is to establish which combination of
arguments leads to which outcome (which age boundary). Here the comparative part of our
approach ultimately crystallize. The comparison will be based on all situations in which an age
boundary changed, including the Dutch changes. This will be performed in the course of this
stud}~ and is not presented in this paper.
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8. Age boundaries in German pension schemes
In the first decades of the 20th centur}~, the age boundar}~ of 65 became firmly set in the
German civil servant pensions and in old age insurance. Since then, 65 functioned as an age-
norm. The private pensions also adapted their age boundaries to this norm.
To stav with this norm however, conceals the remarkable variety of formal age boundaries. In
the course of the 20th century, the norm of 65 is supplemented by a number of early and late
retirement ages. For a more extensive chronological overview of the developments in civil
servant pensions, private pensions and old age insurance, we refer to the Schemas I attached
to this paper. In the following, some of the most important overall conclusions are presented.
We do not elaborate on the differences between types of schemes or periods, because this is part
of our final comparative analysis. In this paper, we are concerned with: (1) the range of
numbers in age boundaries and the different types of age boundaries; (2) the categories of
claimants to whom age boundaries apply and (3) the variable formal meaning attached to age
boundaries.
Tjpolog~~ of age boundaries and categories of claimar~ts
We divided age boundaries into five types (schema II): special early retirement ages, general
early retirement ages, the norm age of 65, general late retirement ages and special late
retirement ages.
Special retirement ages apply to subcategories of claimants. General retirement ages apply to
all claimants. ln schema II the range of ages covered by these types of age boundaries is
illustrated. As is shown, age boundaries range from 45 to 72 years.
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Schema II T~-pology of retirement ages
45 60 special early-
58 - 63 general early
~ 65 norm
general late 65 - 67
special late 68 - 72
As stated above, special retirement ages apply to special categories of claimants. Special earl}~
retirement ages apply to the long term unemployed (60}, women (60), the disabled (60-62).
The}~ also apply to special occupations like teachers ( C 65), air traffic controllers (52-53),
militar}~ officers (45-58) and policemen ( c 65). Special late retirement ages apply to judges (68-
72), university teachers (68) and higher salaried employees (~ 65).
General retirement ages apply to all claimants. In the civil servant pensions, a general early
retirement age of 58 is introduced as early as in 1923. In social insurance and private pensions,
a general early retirement age (63) was only introduced in 1972. In the 1980-s, a general early
retirement age was defined in the Pre-Retirement Scheme (58).
General late retirement ages are scarce and formally introduced in social insurance in 1972.
More explicitly, a general late retirement age is introduces in 1989, with flexible retirement
ages raging to 67.
These types of age boundaries, with their consecutive numbers, groups of claimants and
schemes, show that during the development of the welfare state, the age-norm of 65 was set.
But at the same time, a diversity of age boundaries developed. The institutionalization of one
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homogeneous age boundar}' of 65, was accompanied by a surprising number of deviant age
norms. When we regard the retirement age as synonymous with the start of old age, we can
onl}' conclude that in German social security, some people age quicker than others.
Formal meaning of age boundaries
Age boundaries were presented until now as numbers, formulated in different regulations to
different categories. The most important variable pan of age boundaries has not been described
yet: What is exactly separated by the boundaries? Is a boundary a limit or a gateway? Does
crossing a boundary bring with it rights, obligations or both?
Two, closel}~ related, distinctions are relevant to a better understanding of age boundaries.
Voluntary versus obligatory retirement, and age boundaries marking beneiit receipt and age
boundaries marking exit from employment. When a retirement age is voluntary, this implies the
possibilit}' of choice on behalf of the older employee. Obligatory retirement ages signify
pressure by others. Obligator}~ retirement indicates the permanént departure from the labour
market. Thus age boundaries can have different meaning and consequences.
Obligatory retirement ages were not formulated before 1920123 in the civil servant pensions.
In those da}~s the first contours of a dual age boundary system become visible in the civil
servant pensions. An obligatory retirement age marked the maximum age of employment (65),
the voluntar}~ early retirement age marked the minimum age of pension receipt (58-62). In
occupational pensions - private and civil servant pensions - regular age boundaries demarcate
both the moment of receipt of a pension and retirement from emplo}~ment. Pensions are more
strong]}' connected to work than in social insurance.
In social insurance, a dual, but different system developed. Here, age boundaries mark the
entrance to the old age benefit system. When a wage earner or salaried employee reaches 65,
he receives a pension (if eligible of course). It is important to notice that formally, employment
is not prohibited in the old age insurance pension regulation. Thus, the first and foremost
function of the regular age boundary in the old age insurance scheme lies in providing a
gateway to pension payment. The dual character is reflected in the special early retirement ages.
Claimants of early retirement benefits cannot work while receiving a benefit. To them, age
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boundaries are both gateways to pension payments as well as moments of departure from the
labour market.
In the next section we attempt to understand the patterns found. Why did 65 not become the one
and only age boundary in German pension regulations? What are the arguments behind special
age boundaries for special categories? And wh}~ do age boundaries in social insurance have
different meanings and consequences than in private pensions?
9. Six dimensions of old age boundaries
Retiremen[ ages were not among the primary issues of debate in German pensions. The
questions who is eligible and how much pension should be paid, were much more urgent.
Nevertheless, the discussions taking place on retirement ages in the 19th and 20th century,
provide us with interesting material.
In this section we present the arguments expressed in discussions on changes in the retirement
age. We distinguish six sets of arguments referring to six dimensions of old age. They are
described successively and each dimension will be illustrated in more detail through the
presentation of case-material. Examples are chosen for their clear reflection of a specific
dimension and are not representative for all cases. Before this lively information is presented,
first two overall conclusions.
A first remarkable feature of discussions on age boundaries is that they are hardly ever really
concerned with the contents of the life phase of 'old age'. In disengagement theory and life
course sociology, the start of a new phase in life is often emphasized. Our conclusion is that
not the entrance to old age is important. Crucial is the exit from the labour market and the
entrance to the pension scheme. The discussions we studied, focus on the condition and the
value of older employees and on the financial conditions of pension funds.
A second conclusion concerns the relevancy of a mix of several arguments in each change of
age boundaries. Only different combinations of arguments can reveal the real nature of age
boundaries. Political parties, employers and employees each presented their own views on the
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need for certain age criteria. This conclusion supports our vision of old age as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon. We return to this in our last, concluding section.
Before we present the six dimensions of old age boundaries, it is important to keep in mind that
in fact we try to answer two basic questions: Why are age criteria chosen and not for example
need-based criteria or functional criteria? And why are specific age boundaries - the numbers -
chosen? To this second question, each of the dimensions provides an answer. To the first
question - wh}~ age criteria - only the first two dimensions are relevant. In the firsi pension
schemes, age criteria were selected because they provided satisfying predictors of invalidity and
were the onlv reliable statistics available at the time.
Dimensio~r 1: Ini~alidin~
~ Age indicates ph~~sica! and~or rnenta! invalidin~
An age boundary demarcates the moment partial or complete invalidity is assumed. Invalidity
refers to the physical or mental condition of older employees. The ageing process is the
underlying biological process. Physical and mental decay are seen as a gradual, inevitable
process, problematic to individual and employer. Employers emphasize the effects on the
performance of the worker. Labour unions and social democrats emphasize workers' decreasing
earning capacity. The Invalidity dimension is an argument used in most discussions behind
special early retirement ages".
In all first - public, private and civil servant - pension regulations, permanent invalidity is the
basic central concept and argument to establish age boundaries. Age is an indicator of invalidity.
Indirectly, it is also an indicator of need, because of the supposed loss of earning capacity
through invalidity.
Throughout the 20th century, invalidity remains an influential argument in decisions on who
deserves retirement at what moment. It is for example used to argue against an increase of the
regular retirement age. In 1956, the SPD strongly argues against a suggested raise of the
retirement age from 65 to 70 in social insurance. The invalidity argument is used to demand
"Besides Invalidity, there are more arguments explaining the definition of early retirement
ages. The presentation of our empirical results however, is structured around dimensions and
not around cases. The cases illustrate the dimension, not the other way around.
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special earl}~ retirement ages for special groups of workers or employees. The SPD is in favour
of the introduction of a special early retirement age for women. They argue that of all first time
paid pensions, 70~~ is paid to people under 65 and in the case of women, even 80~~ is unable
to work before 65 is reached'S. Sixty-five ís, especially to women, a poor indicator of
invalidity.
The special early retirement age for Air Trafiic Controllers, is also motivated by reference to
their physical and mental capacities. With increasing air traffic, the demands to this occupation
also increased. Employees are expected to have knowledge of English and should be able to
react and decide quickly. This is presented as the motivation to propose a special age boundary
of 5216. For officers in the army similar arguments are emphasized to motivate special earl}~
retirement ages".
The importance of the invalidity argument to decide on the right age boundary, can be most
clearl}~ illustrated by looking in more detail at the debates around the first old age bouá~dary of
70 in Bismarcks socia] insurance. This age boundary is very interesting, because it is often
referred to as the origin of the invention of age boundaries. It delivers some remarkable insights
into the dynamics of the retirement age.
'An illusion, a decoration and a political mistake'. These are the words used for the proposed
old age pension at 70 years for workers in the invalidity 8c old age insurance18. Liberals,
conservatives and social democrats judged the old age pension at 70 as the most monstrous part
of the law. The old age pension and age boundary were very much at the periphery of the
discussion. The insurance was in the first place intended to provide for loss of income in the
situation of invalidity independent of age (invalidity-pension) and only in the second place in
the situation of high age (old age pension). This order, invalidity first and old age second, very
much reflects the ideas behind the regulation about the gradual process of loosing physical
15BT-W2I143.S, 04.05.56, p.7566 (Bundestag, second election periodl143rd plenary
meeting, date, page).
16BT-Drs (Drucksache) 2095, 14.05.74.
"BT-Drs 2391, 13.01.61; BT-W 101143. S, 13.06.85 .
'aRT (Reichstag)-SO.S, 02.04.1889, p.1189I1196~1201.
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strength. In the explanation to the law proposal, it is argued that from experience it is known
that reaching a high age means in most cases a decrease in the ability to work'Q. This is
described as a fate embedded in human nature. It is a risk occurring to every human being
sooner or later. The needy situation resulting from this universal fate, must be insured. Wh}~
should the 'soldiers of labour', as Bismarck called the workers20, not deserve an invalidity
pension?
Another indication of the central importance of the gradual process of loosing strength, is the
suggestion not to pay pensions based on the last earned wages, but based on the mean wage.
In the commentar}- to the law proposal, it is argued physical and mental abilities slowly decrease
with age and this means that in the end only very little power is left. The pension would turn
out to be ver}' small if dependent on the last earned wage21.
Thus the idea of gradual loss of strength and earning capacity was central. The question then
raised is why then a separate old age pension was necessary? Interestingly enough, this question
can be answered b}~ reference to the same concept of invalidity. The old age pension was
intended to provide a financial supplement to earnings. It was hoped for that this supplement
would relieve the worker from full work pressure and would affect the remaining abilities in
a positive way. Full disability would be delayed-z. In this conception, the old age pension is
of a subsidiary, and preventive nature. When invalidity is an established fact, the older worker
will receive the larger entitlement to Invalidity benefit, instead of the smaller old age pension.
Was prevention and extra protection necessary from the age of exactly 70 onwards? Members
of Parliament more or less agreed on the age at which an income supplement for every worker
was necessary: 65 or lower. Outside parliament the organisation of German Industrial leaders
19RT, Aktenstucke nr. 10, Gesetzentwurf betreffend die Alters- und Invalidit~tsversicherung,
22.11.1888, p.53.
~see: p. 39 J. Ruckert (1990), Entstehung und Vorl~ufer der gesetzlichen





also proposed 65 and some employer organisations even proposed 60 years2j. In the first
readings of the commission preparing the law, the choice fell on 65. But after long discussions,
7G years was accepted, for two reasons. Firstly, because the government strongly preferred a
cautious financial policy. Secondly, because some conservative and liberal members of
parliament preferred no age boundary at all, 70 was their second best choice. These members
of parliament argued that the primary instrument to decide whether a person was unfit for work
should be individual measurement of invalidity. In this opinion, someone over 65 or 70 still able
to work, should not receive a pension. At least the higher age boundary of 70 suggested by the
government, was to these members of parliament a better presumption of invalidity than 65.
Seventy was the age boundary which should make certain that the old age pension would not
become an important and expensive feature of invalidity insurance.
Dimension 2: Administrative Rationalit)~
~` Age is an eas}~ and clear measure
The set of arguments called 'administrative rationality', refers to arguments and behaviour of
policy-makers and policy-administrators. Crucial is the observation that the introduction of age
boundaries involved no extensive discussion. That is, the height of the age boundaries did
provoke debate, but the choice for the age criterion did not. Age is an indicator of invalidity,
need and deservingness. It replaces other criteria.
The self-evidenc}~ of the age-criterion can be interpreted in terms of an important quality of age.
Age statistics were simply one of the few statistics available at the end of the 19th century.
Contrary to the measurement of need, it required no measurement of individual circumstances
to establish someones age.
It is not eas}~ to underpin this argument, because it is based on the lack of discussion on age
criteria. We can illustrate our point however, by analyzing how costs for the first invalidity
insurance by the government were calculated24. At that time, in the 1880-s, figures on the
spread of Invalidity were hardly available and age statistics were in a special position. The
~RT-SO.S, 02.04.1889, p.1188-1207; proposals for age boundaries of 60 and 65 years
(Antr~ge nrs. 149;150;155;167); ideas outside parliament (Conrad, 1994:253).
24RT-Nr. 10, Denkschrift uber die Hdhe der finanziellen Belastung ....
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government predicted the expenditure on the basis of an invalidity table and a mortality table.
The expected revenues out of contributions were based on the age division among eligible
wnrkers.
The construction of an invalidity table was no eas}~ task. In the end, a table was computed on
the basis of: (1) a purely fictional hypothesis on invalidity related to age; (2) figures on
invalidity of one group (railway workers) related to age and (3) some crude occupational surve}~
statistics in which illness, industrial accidents and long term invalidity could not be separated.
The chosen probabilities of invalidity were crude and high enough to be on the safe side in this
gigantic financial undertaken. Though it was admitted that the invalidity risk varied between
occupations and sectors, the lack of precise statistics made it impossible to differentiate.
Overlooking this exercise in predicting future expenditures, the central place of age statistics
is remarkable. Especiall}~ when the absence of references to sources of inedical knowledge is
taken into account. Probabilities of invalidity and death are baséd on age and this is presented
as a self-evidency.
There may be two sides to this self-evidency of age-measures. Both are probably relevant
dimensions to age criteria. Firstly, the centra] position of age is a common sense idea, not in
need of further explanation. As people age, they become invalid and eventually die. Secondly,
age was the only reliable statistic available for the total population at that time. In this view, old
age boundaries in pension schemes are the unintended consequence of the gathered population
statistics.
Dimension 3: Political Emplo~~abilitl~
~ Age boundariespromote political succession and exclusion
Age boundaries can be changed to promote succession or exclusion of certain groups. 'Political
Employability' refers to arguments used to change age boundaries in civil servant pensions in
the 1920-s and 1930-s~. Nor the physical, neither the mental condition of elderly servants is
uThis dimension is not only applicable to the German political situation in this particular
period. It is very interesting to note that the South-African government recently lowered age
boundaries to attain a faster succession of older, white, conservative civil servants, by younger,
black servants, who are supportive of the new South African government (Source: NRC,
'Overheid kleurt moeizaam bij', O1-OS-95).
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the major reason to induce retirement at a certain age: it is their political background and
reliability. Political arguments are used by the government and define the use, the
'employabilit}~' of the older civil servant. Age boundaries function as instruments of succession
and control over the size and composition of the service force. To be effective, retirement at
a certain age is made obligatory.
The traditional servant had a conservative background and the traditional officialdom was
supported by the parties at the right and middle of the political spectrum. After the collapse of
the German empire in 1919 and the foundation of the first German republic, the Weimar
Republic, the civil service had to adapt to the changing rulers and the bad financial situation.
Retirement proved an adaptive instrument. To civil servants in politically important functions,
invalidit}~ or reaching the retirement age of 65, was not a necessary condition to retire2ó. The
introduction of general early retirement ages and obligatory retirement, aimed amongst others
at replacement of conservative and anti-republican civil servants at a quicker pace with younger,
multi-party republican servants'-'.
In the 1930-s the political spectrum changed again, with the national socialists from 1933
onwards in firm control. Changes in retirement ages followed one another. The number of
servants needed, or the reliability of a particular servant, were reasons to apply special age
boundaries. In the 1937 Act-g, voluntary early retirement was introduced and the regular
retirement age for teachers and policemen lowered. Forced retirement on political or racial
grounds was permitted. If a civil servant would not give the guarantee of support to the national
socialist state, he could be dismissed at any time.
ZóGesetz uber die Pensionierung von Reichsbeamten infolge der Umgestaltung des
Staatswesens, 12.09.1919, Reichsgesetzblatt, p.1654; Begrundung zum Gesetzentwurf, RT-Drs
583.
27Verordnung zur Herabminderung der Personalausgaben des Reichs, 27.10.23,
Reichsgesetzblatt, nr. 108, 30.10.23; Hattenhauer, H. (1980), Geschichte des Beamtentums,
Heymann, Kdln, p. 323-24; Wunder, B. (1986), Geschichte der Burokratie in Deutschland,
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
28Reichsgesetzblatt Teil I, 1937, nr. 9, 27.01.37.
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In 1939, the extreme flexibility of retirement ages comes radically to an end, when all early
retirement ages are abolished and all civil servant younger than 70, have to report personally
t~ the administration. They have to re-enter service'-9. This situation is an example of 'de-
retirement'
Dimension 4: Economic Employabilih~
~` Age boundaries offer protection
~` age boundaries promote and delay succession
Succession and exclusion of older employees is not a strategy only dependent on political
arguments. More so, arguments on the economic value of employees, on their 'economic
employability', are important. Neither the physical or mental condition of older employees, nor
their political origin is decisive to the invention of age boundaries. An age boundary is set
according to the value of the older employee on the labour market. A higher age boundary
means wanted employees can be kept in service longer, a lower age boundary releases unwanted
employees at an earlier age.
Social Democratic parties often pleaded for lower age boundaries for groups of employees with
a weak position on the labour market. Employers pleaded for age boundaries serving a well-
balanced labour market. Economic employability is an important dimension behind nearly all
definitions of early and late retirement ages.
We discuss three definitions in more detail: the introduction of a special early retirement age
for the unemployed in 1929; the introduction of special late retirement ages for judges in the
1950-s; the introduction of special early retirement ages for officers in 1961 and 1985.
The fundament of the special retirement age for the unemployed in old age social insurance was
laid in 1929. The introduction of this special early retirement age for the unemployed is worth
looking into, because it is the first adaptation of the general retirement age in old age social
insurance. A special retirement age for unemployed salaried employees clearly goes beyond
29ICremer, E. (1988), Die Arbeitszeit des Beamten - Historische Entwicklung und aktueller
Rechtsstand, Studienverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, Bochum, p.80.
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mental and physical invalidit}~. The definition of occupational invalidity is extended:
unemployment at an older age is regarded as a form of permanent disabilit}~ to work.
In the late 1920-s, the situation of older employees is considered very problematic. Many
employees older than 40 cannot find employment. The question is how this group can be
protected from poverty30. Political parties all agree the situation of older employees is the
result of unemployment. There is disagreement on which is the best solution to solve the
problems of the long term unemployed. Communists (KP) are in favour of abolishing age-
discriminatory policies of employers and the Department of Labour. National Socialists
(NSDAP) are in favour of ineasures to protect elderly employees from dismissal and want to
promote job-creation31. These parties are against the introduction of a selective retirement age
for the unemployed. If changes in the age boundar}~ really are necessary, these two parties
would rather support a general decrease in the retirement age. The communists favour 50.
Other parties look for solutions in terms of income provision. It is argued that Unemployment
insurance is the correct instrument to meet the need of older unemployed employees. The
unemployment insurance however does, due to its short history, not have the financial resources
to pa}~ for unemployment benefits to large groups over extended periods.
The SPD emphasizes the need for a quick solution and supports the option of a special age
boundary for the long term unemployed in the Invalidity 8z. Old age insurance. ln fact, so is
argued by the SPD in parliament, the situation of these older employees can be described as
'without occupation' ('Berufslos'). In this sense, there is not much difference with the definition
of inability to work in old age insurance. According to the Social Democrats, a special early
retirement age in Invalidity Insurance implies a smooth transition between unemployment
insurance and invalidity insurance.
The proposal of the social democrats is accepted. The definition of occupational disability is




unemployed for at least one year. Why exactly 60 years was chosen and not an age boundary
closer to the alread}' problematic age of 40, is not motivated.
The 'economic employability' dimension can also be clearly illustrated in the changes in
retirement ages in the civil and military servant pensíons. These changes produced ver}~
interesting material to anyone interested in retirement ages. The special character of the labour
market for civil and military servants, a relatively closed internal labour market, makes the
function of the retirement age to promote or delay succession, highly visible.
ln the civil and military service, clear hierarchical career paths are set and it is not very
common to shifr between functions or fields within the service. The special occupational status
of civil and military servants ('Berufsbeamtentum'3-), with set careers and life long
appointments, creates a visible problem of succession. The retirement age is one of the
instruments to slow down or fasten succession of older servants by younger servants.
An example of a situation in which the retirement age is raised to reduce the speed of
succession, is the temporary introduction of special late retirement ages for judges at the higher
federal courts in the 1950-s~;. An extensive public discussion on the changes did not take
place. Nevertheless, it is interesting to follow the line of argument presented in the proposals
in more detail".
One argument is central to the change in age boundar}~ from 60 to 68172: the unbalanced age
structure requires postponement of retirement. The following straightforward calculation of the
age structure is presented:
''-This special status refers to a careful balance between rights and duties. The servant and
the state have a mutual, life long contract. The servant serves without a right to strike and in
reward for his loyality he is protected against dismissal and receives life-long financial
protection. The pension is a logical financial exteruion of the salary (see Wunder, 1986).
33A similar situation occurred after the reunification of East- and West-Germany. Suddenly,
many judges were needed in the former GDR. Already retired judges were asked to take up a
function again in the Eastern States.
~BT-Drs nr.897, 18.10.54; nr.995, 16.11.54; BT-W2I57.S, 19.11.54.
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Table 1 Age structure of the Federal Court
Age boundaries: 68 65 68 65 68 65
Bundesgerichtshof: 0 0 President 2 3 Senat-Pres. 3 5 Judges
Bundesfinanzhof: 1 1 President 1 4 Senat-Pres. 2 4 Judges
Bundesrechnungshof: 0 1 President and 1 3 Directors 0 5
Advis.
1 Vice-President
Source: BT-Drs, L1i2lnr. 897, p.3.
The conclusion drawn from this table, is that in the higher courts 27 members would retire
the
coming years when the age of 65 remained applicable. Would the age boundary of 68 be
introduced, then only 10 would retire. The introduction of a retirement age of 68, is judged as
a still bearable change for personnel management policy in the coming years.
After this argument on the imbalance of the age structure, other arguments are presented. Age-
criteria applicable to judges in other countries, and figures on increased life expectancy are
presented to support the implementation of higher retirement ages. In other countries, also
high
age boundaries (70 and beyond) exist. Since 1871, the mean life expectancy for a
30 year old
man increased from 31 years to 41 years in 1951. It is assumed mental abilities
are also
conserved longer. It is very clear however, that life expectancy and international comparison
are only secondary sources of arguments for change.
Of similar importance is the age structure in the military service. The difference
is, that there
is no shortage of soldiers and officers, but a surplus in certain age cohorts.
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At the background of this surplus is the complete restructuring of the federa] army in the West-
German Republic after World War II. The newly recruited, young people, born between 1925
anC 1934, have aged and confront the government with relatively high numbers of middle aged
personnel. In 1961 and 1985 this age structure is clearly the problem for which early retirement
ages present a solution.
In 1961, physical and mental freshness is presented by the government as an argument to
introduce a lower general retirement age of 60 years in the military service. Special early
retirement ages are proposed for officers whose job is physically very demanding. These special
age boundaries vary in the proposal between 42 for officers in the lower ranks, 45 for majors,
48 for lieutenant-colonels and 50 for colonels. The choice for these age boundaries is motivated
referring to a mean age of employability ('Verwendbarkeit'). Added is that in peace education,
officers older than 42 do not have enough contact with younger people to perform their task
successfullv".
The employability of older officers is not related to any kind of inedical evidence. Very briefly
is referred to the experience of World War II, experiences in NATO and the Federal Army.
Also a scheme of the costs of earl}~ retirement is presented and, like in the case of the judges,
an international overview provides support for lower age boundaries. But again, it is clear that
the worries on composition of the workforce are behind retirement age policy. We go deeper
into the calculations made by policy-makers, to illustrate our point.
The line of reasoning in the case of lower ranked officers is as follows: A certain number of
all jobs should be reserved for younger officers. It is calculated that yearly 483 lower officers
are needed. Overageing is defined as reaching 43. Taking into account leave and death of lower
officers, yearly 319 men overage. These 319 men can occupy the remaining number of less-
demanding jobs, not reserved for younger officers, for another 10 years. After these 10 years
they must retire at 52, to make place for the next overaged cohort and the next generation of
young and fresh officers. Similar calculations are made for the other functions. The conclusion
must be that not the condition of people, but the numbers of people and the composition of the
service force, are decisive factors.
'SBT-Drs 2391, p.4-5.
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One more peculiar characteristic of this debate is worth mentioning. The positions taken by the
political parties in this debate are remarkab]}~ different from the positions in the debate on
retirement ages in social insurance. In social insurance, social democrats and labour unions
always pleaded for lower retirement ages. After 1956 for example, a discussion to lower the
general retirement age was started by the labour unions3ó and the SPD expressed her relief,
when ideas to continue employment after the retirement age were off the agenda". In the
discussion on retirement ages in the army however, the SPD complains about the early
retirement ages suggested by the CDU~CSU 8t FDP-government in their proposa138. The
liberals (FDP) are surprisingly the defenders of protection. They plead for lower, secure age
boundaries. Thus, political parties do not take one stand towards higher or lower retirement
ages. Age is not an autonomous, objective measure, but is related to persons, groups or
categories in different ways. Some people need more protection than others. The question
'Retirement ages for whom?' is crucial.
This also becomes clear in the discussion on a further decrease in age boundaries in the military
service in 1985. Between 1986 and 1991, all officers can retire voluntarily when they reach 45
years. The problem of the overageing of the Federal Arm}~ is again presented as a grave
problem3v. The large number of officers between 50 and 60 years forms a blockade of older
officers ('Befdrderungsstau'). The consequences are interpreted as unbearable to the
organization and to younger officers. Many of the older officers are not able, neither physically
nor mentally, to be in command, while younger officers have no career chances.
In the debate, the Christian Democrats emphasize that age is more important in the army than
in other occupational sectors. Older officers are not suitable to be in command. This argument
is supported by referring to the example of Hannibal, who was only 28 when he crossed the
Alps. 7he qualification of over 45 year-olds as not being able to be in command, is not really
doubted in the public debate. Only the Green party (Grunen) remarks that, if old is older than
3óHuster, E-A (1981), Gewerkschaften und Rentenpolitik in der Bundesrepublik, in:
Leviathan, Heft 314, p.539.
37BT-W 2I 187. S-21.01. 57 .
BT-drs 2392, 13.01.61; BT-W3I158.S, 04.05.61.
39BT-W 10~ 143. S, 13.06.85.
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45, important leading positions are taken in by older people~'. The minister of Defense
himself, W~rner, the later general secretar}~ of the NATO, is 51 years old and the Chancellor,
Kohl, is 55. If an age boundary of 45 would apply, three quarters of the CDUICSU party and
half of liberals and social-democrats, would loose their job. These observations receive no
serious attention. Age boundaries are to be evaluated within the particular age structure of the
militarv service.
Economic Employabilit}~ is a dimension behind old age boundaries, showing that old age is
categorical. Old age cannot be captured into general statements on who is old and who is not.
This is decided in the context of specific, occupational labour market contexts.
Dimensiat S: Financia! Resources
~` Age boundaries increase of decrease costs
Do the dimensions mentioned above all refer to older employees in some way, the financial
dimension simply refers to motives to change age boundaries to save money. In this dimension,
age boundaries are a variable on the balance-sheet. Simply put: raising the retirement age saves
money on the pension budget and lowering the retirement age costs more money.
Financial arguments are strongly supported by the government, independent of the parties in
power. They are used in nearly every discussion on age boundaries. Dependent on the financial
organization of a scheme, both higher and lower age boundaries can save money. The first age
boundary of 70 in the old age insurance leaned strongly on financial arguments. In the 1920-s,
in the civil servant pensions, reduction of costs was behind reducing the number of servants and
lowering the retirement age. And we already described how the financial situation of the
Unemployment Insurance was the indirect cause of the introduction of a special early retirement
age for the long term unemployed in social insurance.
Financial arguments however, were not always decisive. Interesting in this respect is the
situation in 1916, when in the middle of World War I, the retirement age for workers was
lowered from 70 to 65 under protest of the govetnment. Debates between 1912-1914 continually
4"ibid, p.10642.
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refer to the financial situation of the social insurance pensions". The government kept arguing
that the introduction of a lower age boundary would result in a major financial disaster. But
after in 1914, the age criterion of 65 was introduced in old age insurance for salaried employees
('Angestelltenversicherung'), all parties demanded equal treatment of workers. The predicted
rise in expenditure was found to be small in comparison to the large social gains and certainly
small in comparison to the money spent on the war. Thus, the large financial sorrows of the
German Empire were in the eyes of many tnembers of parliament, not large enough to prevent
a decrease in the retirement age"'.
Interpretations of financial situations occur within the context of the financial organization of
a pension scheme. It is important to be aware of the different financial contexts. In social
insurance, employers, employees and the state each contribute to the costs of pensions. An
insurance logic, with contributions related to benefits, is dominant. Until 1969, the scheme was
financed through capital-funding, since then a pay-as-you-go system applies43.
In most private pensions, capital-funding remained the dominant way of financing throughout
the 20th century. Employers often pay the full share in most schemes".
Pensions of civil servants are also fully paid for by the employer45. They are paid out of the
yearly budget on a pay-as-you-go basis.
41Denkschrift uber die Vermbgenslage der Invaliden- und Hinterbliebenenversicherung am
1. Januar 1914; see a.o. the following debates: RT-6.S, 15.02.1912; RT-10.S, 20.02.1912; RT-
103.S, 05.02.1913; RT-202. S., 30.01.1914.
'-RT-30.S, 15.01.1916.
a3Hermann, C. (1990), Entwicklungslinien der 100j~hrigen Geschichte der gesetzlichen
Rentenversicherung: Die Zeit von 1957-1991, in: Ruland (1990), p.105-139.
~a.o.: Graef, H. (1960), Die betriebliche Altersfursorge, Schriftenreihe der Lan-
desvereinigung der industriellen Arbeitgeberverb~nde Nordrhein-Westfalens EV. Heft 14;
Towers, Perrin, Forster 8t Crosby ( 1969), Die Betriebliche Altersversorgung in Deutschland,
TPFIC, Wiesbaden.
'SAn exception are pensions in Prussia between 1825 and 1872, where employees paid a
lump sum and a percentage of their wages to take part in the scheme (Kubler, H. (1976),
Besoldung und Lebenshaltung der unmittelbaren preuf3ischen Staatsbeamten im 19. Jahrhundert,
Nurnberger Forschungsberichte, Band 6, Nurnberg.
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In practice, civil and military pensions are due to this different financial context, more sensitive
to short term financial policy than private pensions and social insurance. Retirement ages are
mure often and sometimes even temporarily changed on financial grounds. A good example of
a short term financially motivated change in age boundaries, are the 1975 changes. All age
boundaries are raised with one year. This policy is part of a larger package of expenditure cuts
in the first year of the Schmidt-government. The financial effects of this measure are
presented~. The intervention in retirement ages is calculated to save 11 million DM per year
to the Federal State and 7 million DM per year for the states. The budgetary problems were
only for a short period on the top of the political agenda. In 1977 already, the Schmidt
government is prepared to raise the retirement ages again, because of the bad labour market
situation".
The Pensionreform 1992 is a very recent example of longer term changes in age boundaries
motivated by financial reasons. Age boundaries are to a large extent the outcome of a
demographic calculation. The financial consequences of an ageing population are taken
seriousl}~. In the large societal debate during the 1980-s48, the financial future of the social
insurance is posed as a threat to the future of old age social security. Some present this issue
as a coming financial collapse of the system, others as something that may need a corrective
response, but is mainly dependent on economic processesa9
Around 1985 we can notice a shift in the parliamentar}~ debate, when demands for later
retirement ages are presented more persistently. Raising the retirement age is seen as having two
financial advantages, the number of beneficiaries is decreased and the number of payers of
~BT-W7~Drs 4127, p. 35.
"BT-W8I35.S, 22.06.77, p.2712; BT-W8I19.S, 18.03.77, Anlage 30; BT-W8I32.S,
16.06.77, p.2420.
~We had to make a very brief selection in references for this short summary.
49The first position is defended a.o. by the Frankfurter Institute in 'Reform der
Alterssicherung, Schriftenreihe Bd. 14, 1987. The second position by the labour union IG-
Metall, in: G. B~cker, J. Steffen, Alterssicherung in der Zukunft (no year of publication).
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contributions is increased. A sense that the taboo on late retirement should be left behind.
developss~~.
The SPD is strongly against late retirement ages and warns for the effects on the labour market,
with 2.6 million unemployed. Though the FDP emphasizes the positive element of newly gained
freedom of choice on the moment of retirement, the word 'flexible' is mainly used in financial
contexts. It is clear that financial pressure is behind raising the retirement ages: early retirement
considered too expensive. The competition between labour market policy and financial policy,
ends in favour of financial policy. Gradually, ages in special and general early age boundaries
are raised. In 2012, 65 should be the regular, norm retirement age to everyone.
Dimension 6: The Right to Rest and the Right to Work
~` Age boundaries mark the start of a restperiod
~` Age boundaries should not restrict the right to work
It is disappointing to notice that the main arguments to change age boundaries are occupied with
the value of older employees and the financial situation of the pension schemes. 'Old age' is
hardly ever topic for discussion. We had expected some relation between decisions on age
criteria and ideas on the meaning of old age. This is hardly the case and age boundaries are
indeed, as Conrad remarks, more commonplace changes than a retrospective interpretation of
their role would suggests'.
This last dimension of old age boundaries in pension schemes is an exception. Two ideas on old
age are presented: (1) older people deserve a rest and therefore the retirement age must be low
enough to let them enjoy this rest; (2) the retirement age should be higher, because older people
have a right to work. We called these ideas 'The right to rest' and 'The right to work'. These
are not important in the history of German pensions. Though expressed by the main political
parties, labour unions and church organisations, these thoughts were never expressed loud
enough to exert real influence on decisions. We present some examples of these thoughts,




of older people and changing employment patterns, may coincide with a growing attention for
the Right to Rest and Work.
The idea of a Right to Rest reflects the opinion that old age should not start when someone is
physically or mentally exhausted. Old age should start when someone is still healthy and a
period of rest can be enjoyed. It is reflected in the metaphor of a comfortable 'Lebensabend'.
The effort to protect elderly is connected with the notion of the deserving elderly. They deserve
rest and respect. The ideas of honouring ones parents are expressed mainly by members of
Christian Democratic parties and the churchess-.
We also find this notion of a'deserved rest' in the arguments to lower the retirement ages of
disabled and war victims. In the 1960-s and 1970-s SPD and CDU~CSU argued, that these
groups lived a hard life, have a shorter life expectancy and therefore receive their pension for
a shorter period". They deserve an early rest.
The idea of the Right to Work is connected to resistance to obligatory retirement. Civil servants
in the 1920-s resisted, because pensions were very lows'. It took longer before obligatory
retirement was introduced to university teachers and judges. In 1923, these groups were
excluded from forced retirement at 65. The special treatment of these highly estimated
professions is probably related to the idea of Superannuation ('Emeritierung'). Civil servants
in high positions, could keep their profession and were allowed to wear their formal dress, even
when bad health withheld them from performing their regular tasks. Retirement was not
obligatory and an age boundary rather embodied the possibility to retire. In the earlier forms
of Superannuation in Prussia, a son or son-in-law received the right to succession. He
performed the work and received part of the salary, until the Emeritus diedss
SZEvangelische Kirche Deutschland, Alterssicherung, 1987; W. Steinjan, Sozialethische




ssKubler, 1976, p.74; Sachverst~ndigen kommission Alterssicherungs-systeme (1983), Mó-
glichkeiten und Grenzen einer Ann~herung der Beamtenversorgung an die gesetzliche
Rentenversicherung, Anlageband B, Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung.
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The right to work is also an issue of debate in the case of inedical doctors working for the
Health Service ('Kassen~rzte'). In the 1980-s, the introduction of obligatory retirement, intended
to promote succession of older by younger doctors, meets fierce resistance. The free character
of this type of occupation does not allow for strict and uniform retirement ages, so mainl}
liberals arguesb
In the debates on the 1992 Pension Reform, a broad majority was in favour of more flexibility
in retirement ages. In essence, this position reflects the idea that individuals should be able to
stay in work longer if they want to and should be permitted to rest when they feel the need to.
Complete individual flexibility would be the end of strict and uniform age boundaries in social
security. Taking all six dimensions of old age boundaries into account, complete abolishment
of age boundaries seems far ahead. It is interesting to contemplate over the question what would
be the alternative to age-criteria, an alternative finishing employment careers, providing
protection and promoting succession.
10. Summary of the empirical results and conclusions
Age boundaries are not the homogeneous policy instruments they seem to be. A remarkable
variety of retirement ages was found in the history of German old age pensions. The age of 65
indeed is the age-norm in German pension schemes, but this age-norm is accompanied by a
variety of old age boundaries, ranging from 45 to 72 years and applicable to different categories
of claimants. The picture of the welfare state with one old age boundary, one phase of old age
and one category of the elderly must be reviewed. Some people belong to the category of the
elderly at an earlier age than others (unemployed, women, disabled, special occupations), some
at a later age (university teachers, judges, higher salaried employees).
We tried to identify the most important arguments behind the introduction and changes of age
boundaries. We distinguished six sets of arguments. These are summarized in Schema III, which
repeats our questions and answers.
s6BT-W10I88.S, 04.10.88.
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Schema III Arguments to introduce or change age-criteria
Used in discussions on age boundaries in German pension schemes
Why age-criteria?
~` age indicates mental and~or physical invalidiry (Invalidity)
~` age is an eas}~ and clear measure (Administrative rationalit}~)
Why a lower age boundary?
~` age boundaries indicate mental and~orphysical invalidiry (Invalidi!)~)
~ age bourrdaries promote political succession and exclusion (Political employabilir)~ )
~` age boundaries offer protection (Economic employabiliry)
~` age bouridaries prorriote succession (E'conomic employabiliry)
~` age bouridaries decrease costs (Financial Resources)
~` age boundaries mark the start of a restperiod (The right to rest)
~'hy a higlrer age boundary?
~` age bowidaries dela}~ succession (Economic employabilir)~)
~` age boundaries decrease costs (Financial resources)
~` age boundaries should not restrict the right to work (The right to work)
Invalidity, Economic Employability and Financial Resources are the most important arguments
to change age boundaries, in the sense that they are applied in many cases and are used by
different actors. Administrative Rationality can explain why age-criteria were preferred above
functional criteria or need criteria. Political Employability applies exclusively in civil - and
probably also in military - servant pensions. Ideas on old age, captured in the Right to
RestNVork dimension are not very openly expressed and do not seem very influential.
In the theoretical part of this paper, we posed the thesis that the combination of different
theoretical perspectives would improve our understanding of the diversity of old age. We found
diversity in definitions of age boundaries and in the arguments behind the choices for certain
age boundaries. Two questions remain to be answered: Do the theoretical perspectives improve
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our understanding of the patterns found? And do our empirical conclusions imply adaptation of
theory?
The theoretical perspectives indeed reflect upon most dimensions of old age boundaries. The
importance of invalidity and the idea of gradual loss of abilities implemented in the first old age
pensions, is captured in disengagement theory. Succession is an important argument both in
discussions on the retirement age and in disengagement theory. Thus disengagement theory can
explain the practical dynamics of age boundaries in social security to a certain extent and
provides a useful, broader social framework.
Interpretations of the situatíon on the labour market turned out to be very important to changes
in age boundaries. The political economy of old age made some valuable points here.
Obligatory retirement at a certain age, independent of physical or mental capacit}~, is used as
an instrument to solve the problem of superfluous workers.
The work-society is important, though this is not a very surprising conclusion in a stud}~
restricted to the world of social security. More useful is the contribution of life course sociology
to the administrative rationality dimension. The attractions of age and the unintended effects of
bureaucratic rationalization can be explained within a larger modernization perspective.
Our empirical study however, also provides material supporting the critique on these theories.
Theor}~, we stated in sections five and six, emphasizes too much general social factors instead
of examining the different contexts in which old age is created. Our empirical study looked at
different contexts to discover diversity. Do our results have something to add to theory?
Our general conclusion is that theory approaches social security too much as the homogeneous
field where one retirement age indicates the moment of transition to old age. Old age pensíons
do not define one universal, inevitable moment of retirement. Not all elderly are excluded at
the same age. Old age boundaries cannot be explained by referring to the labour market. 'Old
age' as such, is not an important concept behind the construction of the retirement age.
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We found one norm age boundar}~, but also man}~ other retirement ages for special groups of
claimants. Age boundaries are constructed in specific political, occupational and financia]
settings.
We described two neglected dimensions in theory: the financial dimension and political
employability. The second dimension has limited application to civil and military pensions and
fits in the idea of succession, but is new in the sense that it draws attention to the possibility to
manipulate old age boundaries and use them for specific political goals.
More important is the financial dimension. The retirement age is often the one we think we can
afford. The start of old age in social security is to a large extent ruled by budgetary rationality.
This dimension is well worth examining further. Age boundaries can be lowered or raised to
avoid increases in expenditure, dependent on the way old pensions are financially organized.
Finding certain age boundaries too expensive is a subjective matter, as could be noticed in
discussions. The every-day realit}~ of policy making, with its unpredictable results, is not fully
captured in the theories on old age.
In our opinion, theoretical perspectives should not incorporate these remarks. Theory is
especiall}~ enlightening when it presents a clear vision on old age. In applying different theories
however, we can be more aware of the fact that old age in social policy starts at different
moments, for different reasons. Retirement ages address invalidity, political or economic
employability. They may be chosen for budgetary reasons, or just because certain age statistics
are available. 'Old age' in social security is a metaphor of at least six different dimensions.
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Epilogue
~~'e opened this paper with two illustrations of Happy Retirement!-cards. We described different
dimensions of old age in social security. Cards accompany a ritual and are comforting. The text
on our final social map of retirement looks different:
0 You are physically or mentally unable to work
Q Your age is registered
~ You are not wanted in a specific political setting
~ You are not needed on a specific labour market
~ Your pension or salary is too expensive
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SCHEMA lA Chronologry of age boundaries in pensions for civil servants, military personnel and judges in Germany 1800-1990.
Year Stafe Regulalion Age Special Group Type of boundary
1805 Bayern Dienstpragmatik 70 From 70 years onwards, or a(ter 40 ycars of service, a servant
can enter retirement without proof of disahifity.
He loses part ol his wages, but can keep his title and dress.
1829 Baden Pensionierung 60 Gendarmerie From 60 years onwards, but dependent on
family- and service circumstances, servants receive 33 "G-50`~ of their
wages.
1882 Prussia Gesetz 31. M~rz 65
1886 Reich Reichsbeamtengesetz 65 In both regulations, 65 years is the age at
which a civil servant can receive a pension without proof of disability
('Diensttm(~higkeit'). This boundary did not imply that a civil servant had to retire, nor that the sta[e was forced
to refire servants exactly at 65.
1920 Prussia Altersgrenzengesetz
1923 Reich Personal-Abbau-Verordnung





58 Voluntary early retirement, without proof of disability. Only possible if in the interest of the organisation.
50 Forced retirement, with extra lump sum payment.
65
68 judges,
1924 Prussia Personal-Abbau-Verordnug 58 Voluntary retiremen[
50 Forced re[iremen[.
65 ludges
65 Univ. teachers Voluntary retirement age, but sometimes en(orcement
1930 Prussia Hochschullehreraltersgrenzen Gesetz 68 Univ. teachers
1933 Reich - Any servant could be dismissed at any
moment.
1936 Reich ilnderung Reichsbeamtengesetz 65 ludges .
Year State Regulation Age Special Group Type of boundary (~ourcc)
1937 Reich Deutsches Beamtengesetz G65 Pnlicemen
Tcachers Several early retirernent ages (or speci(ic functions are introduced. These can be pnstponed i( sorneone is still
needed.
Teachers
1939 Reich Verordnung 62 Voluntary early re[ircment
Until 30. Irrne 1940 G2 is replaccd by 60.
1939 Reich Verordunung Mal~nahmen Beamtenrecht
1952 BRD Gesetz Dienstaltersgrenze Richter
The early retirPment age of 62 years is abolished. Civil servants are not allowcd to retire at G5 years, but can
be (orced to retire at 65 yrs or oMer at any time. All retired civil servants youngcr than 70 years are re-activated
and have to report themselvcs tr7 the administratinn.
72 ludges The regulation applies to judges at the higher federal courts. The age boundary o(70 ycars is not relevant when
judges decide to retire earlier themselves or when they are (orced to retire at an earlier age The regulation is
temporary and applies until 31. 12.54 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 19.12.52).
1953 BRD Bundes Beamtengesetz 62 Voluntary early retirement (.~tubig R Wagner, 1991).
1954 BRD Zweites Gesetze AI[ersgrenze Richter 70 ludges 1 ike above in 1952. The age o(65 is mentioned in the regulation as the age (rom which judges can be removed
(rom [heir job. This regulation applies until 31.12.56 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 26. 12.54).





52 Lower ranks The regular age boundary is 60. Only in special cases retirement is postponedby the minister up to a rnaximurn
of 5 years. (Bundesgesetzblatt, 15.06.61).
1974 BRD ~lnderung Gesetz Flugsicherung 52 Air Traffic
Controllers The age boundary is a moment o(exit and bene(it receipt. Postponement is possible with 1 year at a time, unti!
a maximum of 55 years.
1975 BRD Haushaltstrukturgesetz 63 Voluntary early retirernent age.
62 disabled Unchanged.
53 air tr. contr.
f 1 Policemen
~ 1 Soldiers Age boundaries in the police (orce and army are all raised with 1 year (Bundesgesetzblatt, 20. 12.75).
S-2
Year State Regulafion Age Special Group Type of houndary
1979 BRD ~lnderung dienstrechtlicher Vorsch, fi0 disahled
1985 BRD " 55
disa. judgrs No proo( of disability (Dienstun(ïhigkeit) is required. Fxtra carnings arr lirnitrd to DM 425
per mr)nth
(Bundrsgrsevblatt, 3.8.79).
Unpaid retirernent (or a period of 6 to 9 years, until the start o( (early) rrtirrmrnt(Bundrsgesetzblatt, 31.07.84).
1985 BRD Personalstrukturgesetz Streitkr~he 45 o(ficers
Truppendienst volun[ary retirement
,, 53 " voluntary retirernrnt between 1988 and 1991 (Bundrsgrsetzblatt, 7.8.R5)
1985 BRD Ánderung Richtergesetz 65 judges Bundesgesetzblatt, 19.12.85).
60 disabled judges
1986 BRD 62 Carly rrtirrrnent.
1989 BRD Beamtenversorgungsgesetz 65 Regular retirernent age.
62-67 Flexible retirement, with deducted and additional pension payments.
60 disabled (Bundesgesetzblatt, 22.12.89).
Sources:
- Bundesgesetzblatt
- Hat[enhaurr, H. (1980), Geschichte des Beamtentums, Heymann, Kiiln.
- Krrrner, f.. (1988), Die Arbeitszeit des Beamten - Historische Entwicklung und aktueller Rechtsstand, Studienverlag
Dr. N. Brockmeyer, Bochum.
- Kiibler, H. (1976), Besoldung und Lebenshaltung der unmittelharen preu(iischen Staatsbeamten im 19. )ahrhundert,
Niirnberger Forschungsberichte, Band 6, Niirnbrrg
- Stuhig, H-l, G.Wagner (1991), O(fentlicher Dienst - Trend zum vorzeitigen Ruhestand, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt, Heh 11, p.12-16.
- Wunder, R. (1978), Privilegierung und Disziplinierung - Die Entstehung des Berufsbeamtentums in Bayern und Wiirttemberg
(1780-1825), Oldenbourg, Miinchen~Wirn;
- Wundrr, B. (1986), Geschichte der Biirokratie in Deutschalnd, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt arn Main.
- Zacher, H. (1983), in: Sachverst~ndigenkommission Alterssicherungssysteme (1983), Miiglichkeiten und Grenzrn einer
Ann~ihentng der Beam[enversorgung an dir grsrtzlichr Rrntenvrrsicherung,
Anlagrband B, Bundesministerium ftir .Arbeit und Sozialordnung.
Remark:
- Pilots in the army retire at 41 (Zacher, 1983). This is the lowest age boundary. Unfortunately, our material currently does no[
allow us to trace when exacdy this agr houndary was (orrnulated.
SCHEMA IB Chronologr of age boundaries in private pensions - Germanr 1850-1990.
Year Firm Regulation~Research~Litera ture Age Special Group
1872 Siemens Pensions- Witwen- und Waisen- Casse
Wiedemann, 1990





Rohs 8~ Fiartmann (1951)
in: Betriebliche Altersversorgung, 9, 1953:62
in: Betr. Altersversorgung, 819, 1957:119
research TPFIC (1969)
; t)
and receive the pension.
(i 5
65
60 1 ~ men
49"~-53`Y women
6.5 87~-93 ~" men
33"~-3.5"~ women




in: Betr. Altersversorgung, 3, 1971:51
Gesetz zur verbesserung der




From [he minimum age of 50 years a worker can ask to mtire, without prnof of
invalidity.
At the age o( 65 years, complete inability to work is assumeri. The worker can rtim
Firms generally pay their pensions when wage earners start to receive old age
social insurance.
Most firms have adapted their age boundaries to the age boundaries in old age insurance.
Fxperiments of gradual retirement are not known of.
In collective hargains 65 is the retirement age, because this age is generally
accepted and is set in the consciousness o(civil servants, employees and workers.
Private pensions have taken over the lower retirement age of60 years lor women,
foNowing the Rentenreforrn 1957.
Other age boundaries exist, these are mainly used in pensions for the higher
salaried employees.
1n many regulations is (oreseen in the possibility of flexible retirement. farly
retirement at the wish of employee or employer is ohen possible.
The age boundary of 65 years is regarded as the regular age boundary ("Ir'ste
Altersgrenze").
An employee can receive his pension, when he rereives his old age insuranre
pension at the early retirement ages (60 or fi2).
S-4
Year Firm RegulationlResearchlCiterature Age Special Group
1992 diff. firms Linnenkohl e[ al. (1992) SS, 5G,
58, 60, nver 6 S
Type of houndary
(continued)Private pensions have taken over thc (lcxihlc mtimrncnt agcs int h e
Rcntcnvcrsicherung (Heubeck, 1973).
A diversity o( (IPxible retirement agcs can be (nund in lirrn pcnsions. In sornc
computer(irrns 56, 58 or 60 years are accepted early retirement agcs. In the
chemical industry 55 and 58, in banking 60 yc.~rs. 1n one (irm it is possible (or
c.mployces with very important quali(ications tn rrtirc aher 65.
Sources:
- Betriebliche Altersversorgung, Mitteilungsblatt der Arbeitsgemeinschaft ~ur betriebfiche Altersversorgung e.V.
Heubeck, G. (1980), Die ABA und die betriebliche Altersversorgung, in: Heissmann Betrieblíche
Altersversorgung im Umbnrch, Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, p.29-36.
- Linnenkohl, K., G Kilz, H-1 Rauschenberg, D.A. Reh (1992), Arbeitszeit(lexibilisierung: 140 Unternehmen
und ihre Modelle, Verlag Recht und WirtschaR, Heidelbcrg.
- Rohs, H., G. Hartmann (1951), Grunds~tze und Formen betriebliche Altersversorgrmg, in:
Schrikenreihe der Vereinigung No(drhein-West(~lischer Arbeitgeberverbïnde, Heh nr. 1.
- Stubig, H-I, G. Wagner (1991), Trend zum vorzeitigen Ruhestand, in: Bundesarbeitsblatt 1111991, p.
12-17.
- Towers, Perrin, Forster R~ Crosby (1969), Die Betriebliche Altersversorgung in Deutschland, TPFIC,
Wiesbaden.
- Wiedemann, G. (199~), Die historische Entwicklung der betriebliche Altersversorgung unter besonderer
Beriicksíchtigung des Arbeitsrechts, lnaugural Uissertation, Frlangen-Numberg.



















Gesetz uber die Sozialversicherung der Werkt~tigen
Bev~ikertmq von GroB-Berlin
Rentenre(orm
Rentenreform par. 1254 RVO
Age Special Group Type of houndary




60 tmemployed sal. empl. At this age early retirement is possible for the unernplnyeri, after one year of








Also early retirement for the unemployed.
In the Soviet sector of Great-Berlin, wornen receive an old age pension at 60
(Senats von Berlin, 1962).
Limited to women who have an emplnymen[ record o( 20 years preceding their
6och birthday.
After 52 weeks of unemployment in the last 1.5 year.
On condition oI35 insurance years, (lexible retirement is possible (or everyone (rom the age
of 63.
Every month retirement is delayed aher 63, 0.4 ~~ is added to the pensinn




Unemployment insurance - (Sozialplanpensionienmg)
58
59 unemployed
58 is the minimum retirement age. Dependent on a co(lective or individual bar-
gain, a pre-retirement scheme is subsidized This regulation is valid until 1988.
Extension of the duration of the unemployment benelit for special age categories.
For people of 49 year or older, it is extended from 12 to 18 months. This regulatinn
is becorning more popular as a pre-retirement pathway leading to the age boundary
o! 60 (or the unemployed. The unemployment insurance in this respect is known
as [he 'S9-er Regelung'.
S-6
Year Regulafion Age Special Group
Type of houndary
1987 Unemployment insurance -(Soziafplanpensionierung) 57
unernployed In the oldest age category, the duration of the unernl~loyrnent hcncht
is extcndcd
1 1 ti t n r3ctice thc uncrnployment pre rchrement
1989 Rentenreform 1992
to 3Z months, w irc i rneans ra r p ~
pathti~ay cornmences at 57.
65 65 is fonnulated as the regular retirPment age. The age bormdaries of 60
and 63
are raised to 65 in 2001I2004. Not raised is the age houndary o( GO for the
disabled.
6 3-Ei7 Farly and later retirement remain possible For every month ol retirement belore 65,
the pension is reduced with 0.3 "G~. With every mnnth of postponed retircrnent, the
pension increases with 0.5"~.
Sources a.o:
- Prognos AG (1986), Bestandsaufnahme und Bewertung praktizierter Modelle zu vorgezogenen
Ruhestandsregelungen, BMA, Bonn.
- Westerveld, M. (1994), Keuzes van gisteren ... een blauwdruk voor morgen? Honderd jaar
sociale-verzekeringspensionen in de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, Groot-Brittannië en Nederland, SDU, 's
Gravenhage.
- Wol(, ). (1992), Soziale Sicherung beim Ausscheidenaus dem Arbeitsleben in Deutschland, in: Expertisen zum
ersten Altenbericht der Bundesregierung-111, Deutsches7entrum (iirAltersfragen, p.159-190.
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